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Philosophical Perspectives
Summary:
This entry follows in the footsteps of Anselin’s famous 1989 NCGIA working paper entitle “What is
special about spatial?” ( a report that is very timely again in an age when non-spatial data scientists are
ignorant of the special characteristics of spatial data), where he outlines three unrelated but
fundamental characteristics of spatial data. In a similar vein, I am going to discuss some philosophical
perspectives that are internally unrelated to each other and could warrant individual entries in this Body
of Knowledge. The first one is the notions of space and time and how they have evolved in philosophical
discourse over the past three millennia. Related to these are aspects of absolute versus relative
conceptions of these two fundamental constructs. The second is a brief introduction to key
philosophical approaches and how they impact geospatial science and technology use today. The third is
a discussion of which of the promises of the Quantitative Revolution in Geography and neighboring
disciplines have been fulfilled by GIScience (and what is still missing). The fourth and final one is an
introduction to the role that GIScience may play in what has recently been formalized as theory-guided
data science.
Definitions (from Beguin & Thiesse 1979):
Definition 1
Definition 2
Definition 3

Corollary 1
Definition 4

Corollary 2
Definition 5
Definition 6
Definition 7
Definition 8

Corollary 3
Definition 9

Corollary 4

A place s is an elementary spatial unit.
Space S is a set of (at least two) places. Space is interpreted as the stratum of natural
and human processes.
Places are separated and this separation can be characterized by their relative position.
The distance dL between any two places is a length metric. The metric can be ndimensional if there are at least n+1 places - in which case µA is a measure of extension.
A restricted definition of space is given by the triplet (S, dL, µA).
Simple attributes µi are described by a mass available over any measurable subset of
places in S. Composite attributes are then defined as functions of simple attributes
and/or of basic components of space S.
An extended definition of space incorporates simple attributes [S, dL, µA,(µi; i ∈I)].
A moment t is an elementary temporal unit.
Time T is a set of (at least two) moments. Time is the temporal medium for natural and
human processes.
Moments follow one another in a one-way course forming a totally ordered set. As such
time resembles the set of integers.
Subsets of moments have a temporal extension, also known as duration. Analog to its
spatial equivalent in definition 3 and corollary 1 it is defined as the non-negative
measure µD.
A restricted definition of time is given by the triplet (T, ≤, µD).
Simple attributes µi are described by a mass available over any measurable subset of
moments in T. Composite attributes are then defined as functions of simple attributes
and/or of basic components of time T.
An extended definition of time incorporates simple attributes [T, ≤, µD,(µi; i ∈I)].

Description:
A Space and Time
Space and time are two of the first abstract notions that humans learn in their childhood (Stea & Blaut
1973). They are so basic that we don’t pay much attention to them and have difficulties to think
consciously about them. This section will deal with the attempts of philosophers to get a grip on these
concepts. What most lay people and experts agree on is that spatial and temporal properties are of a
different kind than the substantive properties that describe objects and events. Beyond these, we are
dealing with dichotomies: space and time can be conceptualized as absolute (exiting independent of
objects and events) or as relative (coming into existence only as a relation among objects and events).
And space and time can be conceptualized as either being something real (physical) or as something that
exists only in our minds. Whenever we try to deal with space in formal terms, we resort geometry,
which again can be interpreted as an actual description of physical space or a purely mental abstraction.
Philosophical musings about these are somewhat in line with science advances and can therefore be
grouped into classical (mainly influenced by ancient Greek, hence the topic’s image of the School of
Athens), the period of Enlightenment, and modern (20th century).
Classic conceptualizations established all the principles that form our everyday understanding of space
and time. The one exception is the role of numerical theories, which according to Plato reflect the true
nature of things (the episteme) rather than the inferior nature of empirics, which is limited by human
capacity to understand things. The earliest theories are attributed to Heraclitus who observed the
intricate link between space and time and declared everything to be process. For processes to occur,
there must be empty space (the void) that allows things to move and change. Democritus explained
qualitative change with the constant movement and re-configuration of atoms. Everything could be
broken down into parts and counted, even space and time. Plato’s counter-argument that circular
movements allow for a void-less world spawned the transition from simple arithmetic (which does not
allow for irrational numbers) to Euclid’s geometric theory, which synchronized empirical and abstract
conceptualizations and remained uncontested until the end of the 19th century. However, it was
Aristotle’s definition of place that defined space as an absolute container, where each thing finds its
place relative to other things.
This dichotomy, space as an absolute container but all measurements being relative to the things they
are applied to is also reflected in Newtonian dynamics, which was Enlightenment’s modernization (but
not repudiation) of Aristotle’s and Euclid’s theories. There were idealists like Locke and Berkeley, and
most importantly Leibniz, who refuted absolute notions and saw space as a system of relations. Leibniz’
ideas, although never published a single authoritative piece of work, form the strongest argument for a
relativist perspective, foreshadowing post-Newtonian physics but also forming the philosophical basis
for GIS data structures like the Voronoi diagram or Simplicial Complex (Jiang & Omer 2007), yet the
sheer value of applicability of Newton’s methods to science and subsequent industrialization put idealist
approaches on a backfoot (see also section B on relevant philosophical schools of thought). Newton’s
relatively weak arguments for absolute conceptualizations (which was contradicted by his own work on
dynamics) was upheld by the most influential philosopher of his time, Kant. For Kant, space and time are
not aspects of the physical world (and can hence not be contradicted by lower-level theories) but are
mental constructs – very much like Plato’s ideals. He called his philosophy transcendental idealism,
which makes sense at a superficial level but at the same time the term is confusing because his

conclusions were the opposite of Leibniz’. For Kant, there is an unsurmountable distinction between
mutable things on one side and the absolute characteristics of space and time on the other that defined
the ontological basis of much of science and philosophy for the next hundred years.
Modern conceptualizations of space and time are influenced by three significant scientific insights that
changed world views held since antiquity and that are so different from the experiential world of
everyday citizens that they still are not typically taught outside of college. The first of these was the
development of field theory, which got rid of the notion that space outside of things is empty. Maxwell’s
fields are filled with energy of varying degrees of magnitude and thereby give space a material entity. He
broadened physics beyond Newton’s mechanical perspective and allowed energy and matter to be two
sides of the same coin. This was a necessary step towards Einstein’s space-time manifold, where the two
not only influence each other but are also bent by matter/energy. Kant’s neat separation between
material and mental dimensions were thus thrown out. Most of these modern theories can only be
formalized by new mathematics that breaks the bounds of Euclidean geometry and the
conceptualization of a range of mathematical spaces (Riemann, Poincare, Minkowski, Hilbert). Where
both field and relativity theory assume dimensional continuity, its yet incompatible twin quantum
theory posits matter or energy to be discrete. We will revisit this ontological conundrum when we look
at the role of GIScience in the age of data science.
B Relevant philosophical schools of thought
Section A had a sincerely metaphysical touch and disregarded other fields of philosophy such as
epistemology, logic, the philosophies of language or science, or political and environmental philosophy.
We have separate BoK entries on epistemology and ontology, and deal with logical and ethical aspects
of GIScience in other sections such as GIS&T and Society. But there are several aspects of metaphysics
that a student of GIS&T will encounter on a regularly basis and that therefore require elucidation.
Although we have spent some time on metaphysical questions of space and time, we have not defined
metaphysics itself. Metaphysics is about the fundamental nature of reality, including the relationship
between mind and matter and substance and attribute. Science used to be an integral part of
metaphysics and separated only when the scientific methods, i.e., the empirical activity based on
experiments became its own rationale, detached from larger metaphysical questions. We saw this tight
link in section A until about the advent of field theory and newer forms of mathematics.
If the scientific method is about gathering empirical evidence, then it might come as a surprise that
Empiricism is not a branch of metaphysics but of epistemology. Empiricism, not as a method but as a
school of thought is based on the premise that knowledge can come only from sensory experience. This
contrasts with the notions of Rationalism or Idealism, where knowledge may be derived by other means
such as intuition or reasoning. Taken literally or narrowly, Empiricism does not allow for experiences to
be transmitted in form of teachings or tradition. As this is a rather impractical notion, it is here only of
interest as the counter view to rationalism. Rationalism is based on the process of reasoning and assume
that certain “rational” principles such as logic, ethics and metaphysics are so fundamentally true that
the attempt of attaining knowledge without these would be futile. Examples for such forms of reasoning
range from Socrates to Descartes and Habermas. Especially during the age of Enlightenment, rationalism
was the unifying force behind the divergent philosophies of Kant, Spinoza, or Leibniz. Positivism then
combines these two strands. It holds the empirical method in high regard but allows for the deductive
method of rationalism, while adding one additional constraint: Positivism requires the continuing

verification of facts that then results in certitude or truth; it is an epistemology that states that there is
no innate knowledge (as idealists would claim) and that truth can only be found a posteriori.
This conflict between idealism and positivism lies at the basis of the early 20th century school of
phenomenology, where our experience is directed toward things only through particular concepts,
thoughts, ideas, images, etc. These make up the meaning or content of a given experience and are
distinct from the things they present or mean. Following Smith (2018), phenomenology develops a
complex account of spatial and temporal awareness, attention, awareness of one’s own experience as
well as self-awareness, the self in different roles (as thinking, acting, etc.), embodied action (including
kinesthetic awareness of one’s movement), purpose or intention in action (more or less explicit),
awareness of other persons (in empathy, intersubjectivity, collectivity), linguistic activity (involving
meaning, communication, understanding others), social interaction (including collective action), and
everyday activity in our surrounding life-world (in a particular culture).
Although closer to notions of behavioralism in the social sciences, phenomenology influenced many
modern strands of philosophy ((post-)structuralism, feminism, critical theory) in its rejection of universal
truths. It experiences a resurgence in the 21st century as part of the discussion of the role of technology
(in particular artificial intelligence) and the way it alters our ability to reason about fundamental
concepts (π Research Network 2019) – see also section D.
The other big new branch in philosophy, starting in the late 19th century, is based on the works of Hegel
and Marx. The latter rejected both idealism and any form of positivism that is divorced from political
practice, encapsulated in “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is
to change it” (Marx 1886, p 15).
C Unfulfilled promises of GIScience
Aristotle divided theoretical philosophy into natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics
(Copleston 1946). While natural philosophy is nowadays often equated with physics, Aristotle afforded a
significant amount of his works to the description of phenomena that we would associate with the
discipline of geography, be is as a spatial science (including astronomy and surveying) or as the
backcloth of describing and explaining differences in biology, geology, and anthropology. We won’t
concern ourselves here with the history of geography and how its various branches became proper
scientific disciplines by themselves, now with generic systematizations of geographic knowledge. One
methodological development though had significant influence on what is now known as GIScience: the
quantitative revolution in geography in the 1950s and ‘60s.
The quintessential summary of the status of “Geography as a fundamental research discipline” was
Ackerman’s 1958 University of Chicago research paper, which is unfortunately really hard to find.
Ackerman identified the traditional approaches of underlying the geo-relational principle,
regionalization, process-orientation, and identification of co-variances as the toolset common to most
geographers of his days. But then he listed five challenges of “modern” geography, of which one could
argue only one has been adequately addressed by GIScience methods (page 35):
1. Study of the nature of distributions
2. Perfecting observational techniques
3. Study of the effects of processes on distributions

4. Study of covariances of processes
5. Integration of processes in a region
The first of these is easily identifiable as a call for spatial analysis methods. We have made good
progress on these. Back in the 1950, geographers still suffered from a dearth of data. This is where we
have arguably achieved most progress; although this topic will have to be revised in section D. The
remainder of this list is all process-oriented and the importance of this 1958 research agenda cannot be
over-stated. (3) is an acknowledgement of the nature of change (see also the introduction to section A).
(1) is important but useless if we do not study the effect of the context setting of the structure of
distributions as well as their changing nature. This requires considerably more than what we capture in
GIS. Geo-spatial ontologies, scale-dependent analyses, and the general identification of what is
important in a particular topical or chorological context would be first steps to fulfilling this item on
Ackerman’s research agenda but at this point, we are thoroughly deficient in deploying the kind of
knowledge representation that is necessary to check off this item.
(4) deals with the fact that processes interact with each other and across scales. Ackerman does not use
the term system science, but this is exactly what he describes. The 1990s (and early 2000s) saw a
distinct interest in parts of the GIScience community to address this topic with agent-based modeling
systems (Brown et al. 2005, , O’Sullivan et al. 2006, Waddell 2002) but it has been many years since any
significant process has been made in this area.
(5) finally, is the holy grail of geographic GIScience (to distinguish it from mere spatial or other
specialized forms of GIS&T). It requires a very comprehensive perspective and a long-term research
effort that does not fit well into today’s funding scene. Among examples of such visions are the efforts
of the Spatial Decision Support Consortium (2019) and of the National Geospatial Software Institute (GSI
2019). In both instances, however, there is no concerted action towards the development of standards
for the interoperability of libraries of geographic processes, complete with interface definitions so that
our process models can actually talk to each other. Cao et al.’s (2018) work is one of the few examples
of such integrative, albeit not easily replicable work.
D The role of GIScience in the age of data science
While the enthusiasm for geocomputational methods that have the potential of addressing some of
Ackerman’s research agenda items seems to be waning, data science is now promising to fill the gap by
combining geospatial analysis with semantic modeling. The hyperbole of Anderson’s (2008) ‘End of
Theory’ is reminiscent of the broken promises of artificial intelligence of the 1980s. More promising is
the notion of theory-guided data science (Karpatne et al. 2017), which marries contemporary
technologies with the bodies of knowledge of applied disciplines – very much along the lines of what we
expected from GeoComputation but this time based in a computational setting that is informed by
geography and related disciplines. In addition to the exploratory tool chest of data science (Gray 2007)
theory-driven data science's epistemology is suited to extracting additional, valuable insights that
traditional ‘knowledge-driven science’ would fail to generate. Knowledge-driven science, using a straight
deductive approach, has particular utility in understanding and explaining the world under the
conditions of scarce data and weak computation. Geographic theory-driven data science (Faghmous and
Kumar 2014, Miller & Goodchild 2015) is much more suited to exploring, extracting value and making
sense of massive, interconnected data sets stored in Cloud-based libraries (Hey et al. 2009), fostering
interdisciplinary research that conjoins domain expertise using a modern cyber infrastructure (as it is

less limited by the starting theoretical frame). It hence leads to more holistic and extensive models and
theories of entire complex systems rather than elements of them. Capturing these in a consistent
semantic model should be an important part of our research agenda for the upcoming decade (Stoica &
Peckham 2019).
Even more than science and technology being connected, the idea is that they are deeply and
inextricably linked. Until recently, the agreed upon perspective was that science led to discovery, and
then technology proceeded afterwards in application. But this is now neither satisfactory nor, in light of
human impact on the Earth’s systems and hence human livelihood, acceptable: “We seek solutions. We
don’t seek—dare I say this?—just scientific papers anymore” (Chu 2007). The idea of technoscience
(Latour 1987) denotes a fundamental link between science and technology in in form of co-evolution,
and co-production. This can be seen in many contemporary fields such as nanotechnology, synthetic
biology, and climate studies, where it is impossible to separate the scientific from the technological.
The ontological characterization of data cannot be seen as a neutral, technical process; it is instead a
normative, political, and ethical one: in other words, (GI)science is a social construct and not an
objective absolute truth (see section B). It therefore should not be understood as independent of the
thought system and the instruments underpinning their production (Bowker & Star 2000). It is in this
light that Kitchin (2014) proposes the idea of data assemblages, all the technological, political, social and
economic apparatuses and elements that constitute and frame the generation, circulation, and
deployment of data, that take these different influences explicitly into account.
This author has often argued that current GIS are little more than geometric information systems that
concentrate on spatial rather than geographic aspects. To achieve the latter, it is necessary to move
beyond the identification of patterns (which also happens to be a hallmark of data science) to move to
additional analyses that are context-aware such as GIS-based computational modeling, agent-based
modeling, or multi-criteria evaluation to name just a few. This is the main argument of critical GIS and
radical statistics, and to a lesser degree behind the notion of mixed (quantitative and qualitative)
methods popular in public health and social research, where methods and models are employed within
a framework that is reflexive and acknowledges the situatedness, positionality and politics of the social
science being conducted.

Keywords and related topics:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Metaphysics and ontology
Epistemology
Perceptions and cognition of geographic phenomena
Space
Time
Events and processes
Agent-based modeling
GIS-based computational modeling

Bibliography:

Ackerman E (1958). Geography as a Fundamental Research Discipline. Department of Geography
Research Paper #53. Chicago: University of Chicago.
Anderson, C (2008). The end of theory: The data deluge makes the scientific method obsolete. Wired,
16(7), 16.07. Online resource, last accessed 28 Dec 2019 at https://www.wired.com/2008/06/pbtheory/.
Anselin, L. (1989). What is Special About Spatial Data? Alternative Perspectives on Spatial Data Analysis
(89-4). UC Santa Barbara: National Center for Geographic Information and Analysis. Retrieved from
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3ph5k0d4.
Brown D, Riolo R, Robinson D, North M, and W Rand (2005). Spatial process and data models: Toward
integration of agent-based models and GIS. Journal of Geographical Systems, 7(1):25-47.
Cao Y, Huang Y, Chen J and Y Sheng (2018). Geographic Process Modeling Based on Geographic
Ontology. Open Geosciences 10(1):782-96.
Chu S (2007). “UC Berkeley: Panel looks at control of emissions”, reported by R. DelVecchio in the San
Francisco Chronicle, March 22, 2007. Online resource, last accessed 28 Dec 2019 at
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/UC-BERKELEY-Panel-looks-at-control-of-emissions2607818.php.
Faghmous J and V Kumar 2014. A Big Data Guide to Understanding Climate Change: the case for theoryguided data science. Big Data 2(3):155-63, https://doi.org/10.1089/big.2014.0026.
Gold C, Remmele P, and T Roos (1997). Voronoï methods in GIS. In van Kreveld M., Nievergelt J., Roos T.
and P. Widmayer (Eds): Algorithmic Foundations of Geographic Information Systems, pp 21–36.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1340. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
Jiang B and I. Omer (2007). Spatial Topology and its Structural Analysis based on the Concept of
Simplicial Complex. Transactions in GIS, 11(6): 943-960.
Kitchin R (2014). The Data Revolution: Big Data, Open Data, Data Infrastructures and Their
Consequences. London UK: Sage Publications.
Miller H and M Goodchild (2015). Data-driven Geography. Geojournal 80:449-61.
O’Sullivan D, Manson S, Messina J and T Crawford (2006). Space, Place and Complexity Science.
Environment and Planning A, 38:611-17.
Π Research Network (2019). The Philosophy of Information. Online resource, last accessed on 28 Dec
2019 at https://socphilinfo.github.io/resources/i2pi_2013.pdf.
Smith D (2018). Phenomenology. In Zalta E (Ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018
Edition). Online resource, last accessed 9 April 2020 at
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/phenomenology/.
Stea D. and J. Blaut, 1973. Notes toward a developmental theory of spatial learning. In Downs R (Ed)
Image and environment: Cognitive mapping and spatial behavior, 51–62. Chicago: Aldine.

Waddell P (2002). UrbanSim: Modeling urban development for land use, transportation, and
environmental planning. Journal of the American Planning Association, 68(3):297-314.

Learning Objectives; (to be presented in a numbered list, using an active voice)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Explain absolute versus relative conceptualizations of space
Discuss feature and coverage models in terms of absolute versus relative notions of space
Situate examples of GIS&T implementations in terms of philosophical schools of thought
Interpret the backlash against the quantitative revolution in geography in the context of the
technical capabilities of the 1960s and ‘70s.
5. Argue for and against Critical GIS using the assertions provided in section B and D.

Learning Questions: (numbered list from basic to advanced)
1. What philosophical school (section B) would you associate with the field of Behavioral Geography?
2. How, if at all, would you change your answer to (1) if you were asked to implement a behavioral
geography model using an agent-based modeling system?
3. Using Ackerman’s list of ‘contemporary’ research questions, identify the GIS&T technologies and
methodologies of today that could be used to address each of these questions.
4. Find a recent publication on geospatial approaches to complexity and try to determine how the
authors deal with the problem of scale.
5. Find examples for the standardization of model description languages and develop a sketch of how a
model of gentrification or cliff erosion or flood disaster response would be expressed in such a
language. Describe and reason about what makes this a difficult task to solve.
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